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Tables of Contents, abstracts and guidelines are available at www.benjamins.com

The transmission of what is taken for granted in children's socialization

The role of argumentation in family interactions

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Argumentation is often considered as a way to transmit explicit information. However, in daily context-based activities, argumentation practices are embedded in discussions where many norms, beliefs, and values are taken for granted. Our objective is to evaluate the consequences of this daily argumentative processes in terms of socialization. More specifically, we focus on family mealtime conversations and analyze the structure of argumentation thanks to an ideographic methodology based on two models: the pragma-dialectical ideal model of critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004) and the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010).

The results, based on a corpus of 30 video-recorded separate meals of 10 middle to upper-middle-class Swiss and Italian families, indicate that implicits in argumentation are particularly effective in transmitting what is taken for granted in any given cultural community. This effectiveness derives from the fact that presuppositions, i.e. background information not explicitly indicated as relevant, appear as unquestionable. Children, who are largely dependent on adults for their well-being as well as for their knowledge acquisition, are not in a position to call into question these presuppositions. Moreover, in the absence of the background necessary to understand an argument, children have to figure out (initially vaguely) a certain context that enables them to make sense of the ongoing dialogue. This background will progressively be enriched thanks to other interactions. Therefore the chances that many aspects of what is taken for granted in any given family will be maintained in the next generation are particularly high.

The results of this study can contribute to the wider theme of argumentative practices and debates in societal and family issues. Family interactions constitute a favorable discursive arena involving children and adults through different intersubjective positions that are shaped by socio-cultural and interpersonal factors within the contingent context of a discussion. Assuming the perspective of argumentation as cultural activity contributes not only to giving conditions for defining development, but also to framing the context in which the development is supported.

The child learns to believe a host of things, i.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.

Wittgenstein (1969, p. 144)

1. Introduction

The family context is recently coming into light as an important context for the study of argumentation. The whys and wherefores of the increasing interest in the study of argumentative interactions among family members lie in the nature of such interactions. Unlike the contexts usually considered by argumentation scholars such as politics (Zarefsky, 2009; Andone, 2013), the media (Burger & Martel, 2005; Walton, 2007), and law (Feteris, 1999; Dahlman & Feteris, 2013), the discussions among family members are characterized by a greater prevalence of interpersonal relationships and by a relative lack of restrictions concerning the issues that can be tackled (Blum-Kulka, 1994; Pan et al., 2000; Ochs & Shohet, 2006; Bova & Arcidiacono, 2014a).

Mealtime can be considered a privileged moment to examine how parents and children interact and argue, since it is one of the few activities that can bring all family members together daily (Ochs et al., 1989; Beals, 1993; Blum-Kulka, 1997). It is more than a particular time of day at which to eat. Rather, it is an activity during which the parents can be “consulted” by their children about a broad number of topics and, given the relative freedom of speech, there could be some dissensus about what is the right thing to do or to think (Arcidiacono & Bova, 2015; Bova & Arcidiacono, 2015). Although the degree of conversational freedom at mealtimes can vary from family to family and depends on various contextual and social factors (Beals, 1997; Fiese et al., 2006; Arcidiacono, 2013), a series of earlier studies have indicated that the argumentative interactions between parents and children

during mealtimes contribute to the socialization of children toward the rules and behavioral models typical of their family and their community (Pontecorvo et al., 2001; Bova & Arcidiacono, 2013a, 2013b, 2014b; Bova, 2015a, 2015b). As everyday life is full of taken for granted assumptions (Schütz, 1953; Garfinkel, 1964; Takata & Curran, 1999), it follows that, in the family context, a part of the children's socialization is based on implicit aspects in the transmission of normative beliefs. This implication entails a sort of paradox: as taken for granted information is by definition not explicitly formulated and explained, how is it possible for children to share the tacit assumptions of their community?

In the present study, we set out to show how the transmission of parental norms and values, which are often taken for granted within family mealtime conversations, can lead parents and children to engage in argumentative discussions. We will focus specifically on conversations where norms, values, or beliefs are implicitly embedded in communicated information. For this reason, we will consider the role of the social setting, of the actors, and of situational effects in contributing meaning to a conversation, with specific attention to the implicit in the transmission of normative beliefs or values. In this endeavor, we opted for an idiographic methodology based on the contemporary argumentation theory. The pragma-dialectical ideal model of critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 2004) represents the analytical approach used to identify the argumentatively relevant moves. Besides, we decided to integrate this model with the Argumentum Model of Topics (hereafter AMT) (Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010) to systematically reconstruct the inferential configuration of arguments. By doing this, we intend to move one step forward beyond the analytical reconstruction of argumentation, to consider how an argument is connected to its standpoint. The AMT model allows distinguishing premises of procedural (logical) nature from contextual (cultural) premises, and it is particularly important in our case to understand the procedural implicit and explicit premises used by parents in their argumentation.

The present chapter is structured as follows. In its first part, a concise review of the most relevant literature on implicit language in everyday verbal interactions (§2) and on family argumentation at mealtimes (§3) will be presented. Subsequently, the data corpus of the research (§4) and the analytical approaches adopted for the analyses (§5) will be introduced, thus providing the methodological and conceptual framework on which the present study is based. In the last part of the chapter, the results obtained from the analyses (§6) will be discussed in terms of the social value attributed to what is taken for granted within family conversations to socialize children (and parents) to engage in argumentative discussions. Some implications of how norms, values, and beliefs are implicitly embedded in communicated information will also be presented in the final part of the chapter (§7).

2. Taken for granted information in ordinary verbal interactions

The way human speakers can understand each other has fascinated linguists and philosophers for a very long time. Plato, for instance, was wondering how it is possible to gain any knowledge: either you already know something and you do not have to learn it, or you do not know it and you will not be able to stop your research when the object of knowledge is reached (Plato, 1967, p. 80e). This paradox has its equivalent in communicative processes: either the informee already possesses the communicated information, and s/he is not learning anything, or it is unknown for him/her and how could s/he even start to make sense of it? To solve this paradox, most scholars admit that everyday conversations presuppose a *common ground* between the speakers. If they talk about football, for instance, and A says: “Italy will win the World Cup”, they do not have to explain that Italy is a country, what a country is, that it has a national football team and that a world event is about to start where the best national teams will compete. This information is *taken for granted*, the speaker presupposing that all the people involved in the conversation share “common knowledge” about the subject that is discussed (Lewis, 1969).

To avoid the communicators getting involved in an endless process of specification (“what is Italy”, “what is football”, “what is winning”, etc.), Searle (1983, 1992) proposed that every act of language happens on a foreground of what he called a *background*. This background includes biological and cultural capacities, skills, stances, assumptions, and presuppositions that are not explicitly communicated but necessary for the receivers to understand what is communicated. Searle distinguishes between two kinds of background: the *deep* background refers to the natural human condition, i.e. biological skills and universally human capacities, such as eating, walking, or playing; and the *local* background that, by contrast, is composed of skills and abilities that are specific to a particular social group or a given culture. For instance, if you hear at a playground a male voice saying: “jump, my little frog,” you do not expect to see a real frog jumping on the ground (Clément & Kaufmann, 2005). You guess, in such a context, that it is a father who fondly encourages his offspring to act courageously. To be able to interpret such statements so quickly and easily, you need to activate a certain number of “natural” expectancies about what could happen, biologically as well as culturally, in such social settings.

Nowadays, such descriptions could appear obvious but we think that the existence of a background has some significant – and maybe paradoxical – consequences for the understanding of children’s development and socialization. On the one hand, we have seen that communication requires a vast amount of shared knowledge that is not explicitly communicated. On the other hand, much of this taken for granted information remains implicit in daily conversations. Therefore,

how could children ever understand what is communicated to them if they cannot access such essential parts of linguistic exchanges? Part of the answer probably resides in the deep background. Recent research shows that children seem to possess cognitive skills that enable them to solve specific problems in different kinds of environments (physical, biological, social, etc.) rapidly and effortlessly. Many of these domain-specific information-processing systems have been proposed accordingly to the properties of the environment they are designed to pick out: naïve physics (physical entities – causal law, cf. Baillargeon, 1987; Spelke, 1994), naïve biology (living beings – genetic transmission, cf. Atran, 1998; Keil, 1998), naïve psychology (mental states – intentional attribution, cf. Wellman, 1990; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000), naïve morality (rules of welfare and justice – ethical evaluation, cf. Turiel, 1983; Nucci, 2001), naïve arithmetic (small numbers – quantificational computation, cf. Dehaene et al., 1999; Baillargeon & Carey, 2012) and naïve sociology (social relations and positional rules, cf. Hirschfeld, 1995, 1999; Clément et al., 2011; Kaufmann & Clément, 2014). One can expect that these “natural” abilities enable children to constitute “on their own” what Searle (1983, 1992) calls the deep background: the world is parsed “for them” in a certain way and they do not systematically rely on others to understand the most invariable parts of their natural environments.

Things are far less obvious when we try to understand how children can constitute the *local* background. By observing the cultural habits of their reference group, children can probably infer a certain number of rules and ways of doing things “appropriately”. However, they depend extensively on the *testimony* of others to constitute the encyclopedic knowledge that is characteristic of any culture. Recently, the importance of testimony in socialization has been highlighted by experimental research (Sabbagh et al., 2003; Clément et al., 2004; Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Birch et al., 2008). This inquiry, however, is essentially focused on the way *explicit* information is communicated to children. Now we have seen that not everything, that social members are supposed to know, is explicit nor explicitly transmitted. This aspect has been suggested long ago by social scientists. For Schütz (1954), much of what is “taken for granted” has nothing to do with reflexion or introspection but is “*a result of processes of learning or acculturation*” (p. 264). This common sense corresponds to the more or less unthinking commitment to the logic and values of one’s “mother” social environment and is embedded in an “illusion”, “*the fact of being caught up in and by the game, of believing (...) that the game is worth playing and that the fact of playing is worth pursuing*” (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 76–77).

In linguistic terms, the paradox could be formulated in a slightly different form and it refers to *presuppositions*. In discourse, a presupposition is an implicit

assumption about the world or about a background belief relating to an utterance whose truth is taken for granted. According to Ducrot (1969), a presupposition is presented as an unavoidable frame in which the conversation takes place: it involves a sort of collusion between the people who are communicating (see Kaufmann, 2002). In the case of young children, the difficulty is to enable them to share frames that are presupposed in most dialogues. If verbal communication involves hearers interpreting the statements (Sperber & Wilson, 1985), how is it possible for a child to disambiguate a proposition (P) like: “*We won’t go on holidays in that country: it has too many mosques*”?¹ Most often, adults will not make explicit their prejudices and the young hearer will have to make sense of this proposition by him/herself. Of course, he/she can recruit his/her encyclopedic knowledge about the Muslim’s places of worship; it is possible that s/he has acquired sufficient information on this topic, for example by seeing mosques in books or on television. But understanding (P) involves substantial inferential work to understand the link between mosques and the decision to avoid visiting that country. In a first step, the child could, for instance, imagine a literal meaning: there are so many mosques in that country that you can almost not move around. However, without explicitations, it will take him/her a long time, and many other statements with a similar presupposition (like “oh, no, please do not tell me that s/he will marry a Muslim!”) to eventually figure out that the common ground, in this case, is a poor opinion of the Muslim community and culture.

In this paper, we will argue (1) that there are specific situations in daily life that are particularly important for children to acquire their community’s presuppositions: *family mealtime conversations*; and (2) that there are kinds of verbal exchanges where presuppositions play a major role: *argumentations*.

3. Argumentation and implicit in family mealtime conversations

Over the last two decades, many scholars from different disciplines have devoted increasing attention to the study of argumentative interaction among family members. A milestone in family argumentation studies is the educational and anthropological research carried out by Blum-Kulka (1993, 1997, 2008) within American and Jewish families, by Ochs and her colleagues within American families (Ochs & Kremer-Sadlik, 2013 provide a comprehensive overview of these studies; see also Ochs et al., 1996; Ochs & Shohet, 2006; Ochs & Schieffelin, 2011), and by Pontecorvo and her

1. We would like to thank our colleague Louis de Saussure for this example.

colleagues within Italian families (Pontecorvo, 1993; Pontecorvo & Fasulo, 1997; Pontecorvo & Sterponi, 2002; Pontecorvo & Arcidiacono, 2007, 2010). These authors have highlighted the relevance of mealtimes as sites to observe how behaviors and points of view of family members are put into doubt, and their studies have shown that argumentative discussions between parents and children at mealtimes are opportunities for children to learn the reasons on which cultural practices, values, and rules are typically based.

Recently, several scholars have examined the structure as well as the linguistic elements characterizing the argumentative interactions between parents and young children. For instance, these conversations exhibit some recurrent ways of starting argumentative confrontation, notably of advancing doubts. One such way is the Why-question, often – but not solely – asked by children to their parents. According to Bova and Arcidiacono (2013b), this type of question challenges parents to justify their rules and prescriptions, which frequently remain implicit or based on rules not initially known by or previously made explicit to children.

One of the aspects that recent studies on family argumentation have brought to light are the various argumentative strategies used by parents to transmit rules to their children on how to behave at home (e.g., Bova & Arcidiacono, 2014b) as well as in social situations outside the family context (e.g., Sterponi, 2003, 2009; Aronsson & Cekaite, 2011). Although argumentation within the family context is a powerful tool to socialize children to the rules and the norms of everyday life, there are few studies about the implicit ways used by family members to transmit educational messages. In a study by Perregaard (2010), it has been shown how families, when gathering around the dinner table, explicitly or implicitly compare or reconcile the communicative practices of family life with the different institutional settings through which they also move and interact daily. The study concluded that required standards or principles of behavior of family members are negotiated during conversations, and children's ability to maneuver between different topics is a product of these communicative processes.

Other studies have highlighted how parents use language to convey norms and rules governing both linguistic and socio-cultural behavior. For example, De Geer (2004) has shown that this conveyance can be direct or indirect, explicit or implicit and may appear in the form of direct instructions or commands on how to behave or in the use of language. These results imply that rules come in multiple forms within family and are negotiated in different ways, either implicitly or explicitly. In fact, explicit rules are talked about, negotiated, and agreed upon by family members, while implicit rules are not spoken about until they are violated, but are understood by family members (Turner & West, 1998).

This synthetic (and partial) view of the available literature shows that studies on argumentation in the family context singled out a set of argumentative strategies typically adopted by parents to socialize their children to the values and norms typical of their culture. However, we believe that there is still a lack of knowledge regarding the role played by argumentation in the transmission of normative beliefs. We refer in particular to the transmission of norms and values that are mainly based on implicit aspects, namely, that are often taken for granted within the family mealtime conversations. The present study, which aims to show how the argumentative discussions between parents and children can occur when the children do not respect these “taken for granted” parental norms and values, is mainly a further contribution to this research strand. In the next sections of this chapter, we will present the research design (conceived to observe family discussions at home during mealtimes), as well as the main results of our study.

4. Methodology

4.1 Data corpus

This study is part of a project devoted to the analysis of family argumentation.² The research design involves a corpus of thirty video-recorded separate family meals (constituting about twenty hours of video data), constructed from two different sets of data, named *sub-corpus 1* and *sub-corpus 2*. All participants are Italian-speaking. The length of each recording varies from 20 to 40 minutes.

Sub-corpus 1 consists of 15 video-recorded meals in five middle to upper-middle-class Italian families in high socio-demographic group³ living in Rome. The criteria adopted in the selection of the Italian families were the following: the presence of both parents and at least two children, of whom the younger is of preschool age (three to six years). All families in sub-corpus 1 had two children. Sub-corpus 2 consists of 15 video-recorded meals in five middle to upper-middle-class Swiss families in a high socio-demographic group, all residents in the Lugano area.⁴ The

2. We are referring to the Research Module “Argumentation as a reasonable alternative to conflict in the family context” (project no. PDFMP1-123093/1) funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF).

3. Based on the parental answers to questionnaires about socio-economic status (SES) and personal details of family members that participants filled before the video-recordings.

4. Lugano is the largest city in the southernmost canton of Switzerland, the canton of Ticino. Switzerland has four national languages: French, German, Italian and Romansh. The canton of Ticino is the only canton in Switzerland where the sole official language is Italian.

criteria adopted in the selection of the Swiss families mirror the criteria adopted in the creation of sub-corpus 1.⁵ Families had two or three children.

Detailed information on family constellations in sub-corpora are presented in Appendix 1.

4.2 Participants' recruitment and transcription procedures

All participants were approached through an information sheet outlining in clear language the general purpose of the study and providing information about how the video data would be used. Consent letters were written following the Swiss Psychological Society (SPS) and the American Psychological Association (APA) guidelines. As specified in a release letter signed by the researchers and the parents, all family members (both parents and children) gave us permission to video-record their mealtimes, provided the data would be used only for scientific purposes and privacy would be respected. The package also made clear to participants that they could choose to withdraw from the study at any time and that any concerns they had about the ethics of the study could be referred to the researchers for clarification at any time.

In a first phase, all family meals were fully transcribed adopting the CHILDES standard transcription system CHAT (MacWhinney, 2000), with some modifications (see the Appendix 2) introduced to enhance readability, and revised by two researchers until a high level of consent (agreement rate = 80%) has been reached. Verbal utterances and nonverbal expressions with a clear communicative function relevant to the meal activity were identified and described in the transcription. Afterward, we reviewed together with the family members the transcriptions. This procedure allows asking the family members to clarify passages that were unclear to researchers on account of low level of recording sound and vague words and constructions. Information on the physical setting of the mealtimes, i.e. a description of the kitchen and the dining table, was also made for each family meal. In the transcription of the conversations, this practice has proved very useful for understanding some passages that, at first sight, appeared unclear.

In the present study, data are presented in the original (Italian), using regular font, whereas the English translation is added below using bold font. In all examples, all turns are numbered progressively within the discussion sequence, and family members are identified by role (for adults: father, mother) and by name (for children). To ensure the anonymity of children, the names in this study are pseudonyms.

5. Despite the data corpus is constituted of families of two different nationalities, a cultural comparison aimed at singling out differences and similarities between the two sub-corpora from an argumentative point of view is not a goal of this study.

4.3 Definition of argumentative situation and identification of the conversational sequences

The analyses we present in this chapter are limited to and focused on the study of analytically relevant argumentative moves, i.e. “*those speech acts that (at least potentially) play a role in the process of resolving a difference of opinion*” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 73). In particular, the discussion is considered as argumentative if the following criteria are satisfied: (I) a difference of opinion among parents and children arises around a certain issue; (II) at least one standpoint advanced by one of the two parents is questioned by one or more children, or vice versa; (III) at least one family member puts forward at least one argument either in favor of or against the standpoint being questioned.

For the present study, only the discussions that fulfill the three criteria mentioned above were selected for analysis, while all non-argumentative conversations were excluded. An example of non-argumentative conversation is the following dialogue between a mother and a 6 year-old daughter, Giorgia.

Italian family. Participants: father (DAD, 34 years), mother (MOM, 33 years), Giorgia (GIO, 6 years 6 months), Clara (CLA, 3 years 1 month)

- %act: GIO gioca con MOM seduta sulle gambe di MOM
GIO plays with MOM seated on MOM's legs
- 1 *MOM: Clara è coccolata da tutti a scuola ((scuola materna))
Clara is cuddled by everyone at school ((kindergarten))
- 2 *GIO: perché è coccolata da tutti?
why is she cuddled by everyone?
- 3 *MOM: perché è piccola [: ridendo]
because she is a baby [: laughing]
- 4 *MOM: è proprio piccola [: ridendo]
she is really a baby [: laughing]
- %act: MOM e GIO ridono
MOM and GIO laugh
- 5 *MOM: non è vero?
isn't it?
- 6 *GIO: sì certo [= sorridendo].
yes sure [: smiling]

This sequence starts with the mother saying to her older daughter Giorgia that her young sister Clara is coddled by everyone at kindergarten. Clara is playing seated on her mother's legs. The mother's expression appears to be a way to keep playing with her young daughter. Giorgia replies to her mother by advancing a request of explanation: Why is Clara coddled by everyone at kindergarten? This sequence is an example of non-argumentative conversation because there is no difference of opinion between the mother and her older daughter Giorgia. In fact, by asking a Why-question, Giorgia is not casting doubt on the fact that everyone is cuddling her younger sister at the kindergarten, but she manifests her interest to know why.

In a first phase, we selected all the argumentative discussions among family members concerning norms and values as topic of discourse that occurred in the corpus of thirty separate meals ($N = 77$). In this way, we have built a collection of similar argumentative sequences around our topic of interest. Later, for the scope of the present study, we only referred to the argumentative discussions between parents and children ($N = 65$; 84%).

5. Analytical approach

The analytical approach on which this study is based refers to the pragma-dialectical ideal model of critical discussion and the AMT. We decided to integrate these approaches as two steps of the same process of analysis since they cover two relevant and complementary levels of the organization of the argumentative activity: the reconstruction of the structure of the argumentative discussions and the analysis of the procedural implicit and explicit premises used by parents in their argumentation.

To reconstruct the structure of the argumentative discussions, in a first phase of the analysis we will refer to the ideal model of a critical discussion. This model does not describe reality, but how argumentative discourse would be structured were such discourse solely aimed at resolving differences of opinion. Confrontation, in which disagreement regarding a certain standpoint externalized in a discursive exchange or anticipated by the speaker, is, therefore, a necessary condition for an argumentative discussion to occur. The pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion spells out four stages that are necessary for a dialectical resolution of differences of opinion between a protagonist that advances and sustains a standpoint and an antagonist that assesses it critically: at the confrontation stage, it is established that there is a dispute. A standpoint is advanced and questioned; at the opening stage, the decision is made to attempt to resolve the dispute by means of a regulated argumentative discussion. One party takes the role of protagonist, and the other party takes the role of antagonist; at the argumentation stage, the protagonist defends his/her standpoint and the antagonist elicits further argumentation from him/her if s/he has further doubts; at the concluding stage, it is established whether the dispute has been resolved on account of the standpoint or the doubt concerning the standpoint having been retracted. This model is assumed, in the present study, as a grid for the analysis of argumentative discussions in the family context, since it provides the criteria for the identification and reconstruction (heuristic and analytic function) of the argumentative moves by parents and children.

To analyze of the procedural implicit and explicit premises used by parents in their argumentation, we will refer to the AMT. This model is particularly important in our case to understand the procedural implicit and explicit premises used by

parents in their argumentation, since it allows distinguishing premises of procedural (logical) nature from contextual (cultural) premises. As stated by Rigotti and Greco Morasso (2010, p. 490), the AMT is an instrument that serves “to illustrate the structure of reasoning that underlies the connection between a standpoint and its supporting arguments”. In particular, two fundamental components should be distinguished when identifying the inferential relation binding the premises to the conclusion of argumentation. First, an argument identifies a topical component which focuses on the inferential connection activated by the argument corresponding to the abstract reasoning that justifies the passage from the premises (arguments) to the conclusion (standpoint). The inferential connection underlying the argument is named with the traditional term *maxim*. Maxims are inferential connections generated by a certain semantic ontological domain named *locus*. Second, an endoxical component, which consists of the implicit or explicit material premises shared by the discussants that combined with the topical component grounds the standpoint. These premises include *endoxa*, that are general principles, values, and assumptions that typically belong to the specific context, and *data*, which consist of facts or other information regarding the specific situation at hand and include the part of the argument that is made explicit in the text. Despite its particular concern for the inferential aspects of argumentation, the AMT, *de facto*, accounts not only for the logical aspects of the argumentative exchange (topical component), but also for its embeddedness in the parties’ relationship (endoxical component), and thus proves to be particularly suited for the argumentative analysis of ordinary conversations such as family mealtime discussions.

6. Results

In this section we will present and discuss some excerpts of family dinnertime interactions to show how norms and values are often taken for granted. In particular, the argumentative discussions between parents and children, occurring when the children do not respect taken for granted parental norms and values, have been organized into different sections according to the topics of the participants’ discussions. More specifically, the first excerpt concerns a discussion around societal rules, gender representations, and adults’/children’s attitude toward lifestyle. The second excerpt concerns a context-bound activity, namely the norms at dinner table, and the third excerpt concerns prejudices and cultural-based arguments about foreigners. For each excerpt an analysis of the participants’ discursive moves and an inferential reconstruction of the argument will be provided to build a collection of cases that will be discussed in the final part of the chapter.

Excerpt 1.

Italian family. Participants: father (DAD, 39 years), mother (MOM, 36 years), Manuela (MAN, 9 years, 7 months), Adriano (ADR 5 years, 7 months), aunt (AUNT, 40 years). All family members are seated at the table. DAD sits at the head of the table, MOM sits on the right-hand side of DAD, while MAN, ADR, and AUNT sit on the opposite side.

1. *MAN: quando sarò grande, sarò zitella ((non sposata))
when I become an adult, I would like to remain
single/spinster ((not married))
2. *AUNT: zitella? non vuoi un marito?
not married? you don't want a husband?
3. *MAN: no::
no::
4. %pau: 2.0
5. *AUNT: perché?
why?
6. *MAN: perché, non mi va.
because, I don't want to.
7. *DAD: perché, gli uomini non vanno bene, no? no, eh?
because, men are no good, right? right, eh?
8. %pau: 4.0
9. *DAD: perché, gli uomini sono bestie, secondo te? ((MAN
scuote la testa orizzontalmente))
because, men are beasts, do you think? ((MAN shakes her
head from side to side))
- *DAD: eh, lo vedi. alto concetto questo, eh.
eh, you know. this is a big question, eh.
10. %pau: 5.0
11. *DAD: voi donne, siete il sesso debole, vero?
you women, you are the weak sex, right?
12. *MAN: come ti permetti!
how dare you!

In Excerpt 1, Manuela presents a hypothetical future plan, opening a problematization during conversation. The question is about the possibility (or not) for Manuela to remain single (unmarried). The topic of marriage reveals a discrepancy between the adult expectations and the idea of the child. In fact, in her turn 1, Manuela expresses a plan for the future, confirming her actual position (she is not yet *adult*). The reaction of the aunt seems to be surprised, because Manuela's future plan relates to an undervalued condition in society (to be an unmarried adult). However, it is important to specify that the term "zitella" corresponds to the English "spinster," that has a negative connotation. The Why-question asked by the aunt (who is married) in turn 5 is a good cue that the child's claim has been perceived as culturally unusual. This aspect is central and the father advances a series of arguments to "ridicule" the child and, ironically, to put Manuela under the obligation of finding arguments to defend her initial statement. In fact, in turn 7 the father's intervention reveals an implicit negative perception of the judgment of

the male gender in Manuela's assertion. The father uses the tag question "right" as an "extreme case formulation," that allows one to defend against challenges to the legitimacy of complaints and accusations (Pomerantz, 1986). In general, speakers tend to use extreme case formulations when they anticipate or expect the interlocutor to undermine their claims and when they are in adversarial situations. Thus, the father's statement produces an implicit reference to the general male and female positions. During the verbal exchange, Manuela doesn't provide arguments to reply to the father's interventions although his claim seems to ask for accounts (such as "Manuela, are you sure of what you are saying?").

Excerpt 1 illustrates how participants can exploit accusations as a discursive resource to build opposite points of view in conversation as expressions of different (implicit and/or explicit) positions. Also, it shows that extreme case formulations are rhetorical devices that disputants can employ in defending against prospected challenges to the legitimacy of complaints. Therefore, as soon as Manuela expressed her choice, she is confronted (1) with the expression of surprise of her aunt and (2) with the irony of her father. It is interesting to notice that the father did not propose an explicit argumentation about the merits of marriage. By his extreme case formulation, he shows that such an idea can only be based on misconceptions; by default, the desirability of marriage is *taken for granted*.

The reconstruction of the argumentative discussion between Manuela and her father is summarized below:

<i>Issue</i>	Is Manuela right to not to want marry anyone (when she becomes an adult)?
<i>Standpoint(s)</i>	(MAN) I am right to not to want marry anyone (when I become an adult) (DAD) You are wrong to not to want marry anyone (when you become an adult)
<i>Argument</i>	(MAN) No argument in support of her standpoint (DAD) Because men are good (they are not beasts)

In the analysis of the selected argumentative discussion, we will focus on the argument put forth by the father: "because men are good (they are not beasts)." The Y-structure (so-called because its form looks like the letter Y) in Figure 1 will be the graphical tool adopted for representing the AMT's reconstruction. Instances of applications of the AMT's reconstructions by using the Y-structure can be found in several studies devoted to argumentation in various contexts (see e.g., Greco Morasso, 2012; Palmieri, 2012; Bova & Arcidiacono, 2013a; Bova, 2015c):




Figure 1. AMT-based reconstruction of Dad's argument in Excerpt 1.

The father's argument is based on a maxim that is engendered from the *locus from termination and setting up*: "If action p is typically done by people, then doing p is desirable." Greco Morasso (2011, p. 173), provides a precise definition of this locus:

The locus from termination and setting up binds the acceptability of a state of affairs to the acceptability of one or more of its implications. For example, if a certain state of affairs is expected to bring positive consequences, one is led to conclude, on the basis of this locus, that it has to be accepted or even welcomed: for example, one might reason the positive value of going on a diet from the expected outcome to get fit, healthier, and so on. Contrariwise, a state of affairs is to be avoided if its consequences are negative.

The reasoning follows with a syllogistic (i.e. inferential) structure, "Marriage is a normal typical life choice for people" (minor premise), which leads to the conclusion that "It is desirable to get married." However, this is only one part of the argumentation. The fact that "Marriage is a typical life choice for people" needs further justification; unlike the maxim, this is not an inferential rule but a factual statement that must be backed by contextual knowledge. Looking at the endoxical syllogism of the diagram, the endoxon is the following: "Living with somebody else is a typical choice for people." The datum "Marriage is a choice through which a man decides to live with a woman (and vice versa)" combined with the endoxon lead to the first conclusion that "Marriage is a typical life choice for people." This example

illustrates how some social norms or values are so deeply embedded in the social background that they do not necessitate any explanations. In a family, for instance, the fact that it could be preferable to live alone seems almost unthinkable (at least publicly) and belongs to the common ground.

The second example is focused not on expectations about family life in general but on the proper ways to behave in social settings.

Excerpt 2.

Italian family. Participants: father (DAD, 38 years), mother (MOM, 37 years), Ugo (UGO, 9 years, 9 months), Luisa (LUI, 3 years, 10 months). All family members are seated at the table. DAD sits at the head of the table, MOM sits on the right-hand side of DAD, while UGO and LUI sit on the opposite side.

1. %act: Ugo tenta di versare l'acqua nel suo bicchiere tenendo la bottiglia dal fondo con una sola mano, simile al modo in cui i camerieri servono il vino al ristorante, rischiando di far cadere la bottiglia sul pavimento.
Ugo tries to pour water into his glass by holding the bottle from the bottom with just one hand, similarly to the way in which waiters serve wine in a restaurant, risking dropping the bottle on the floor.
2. *MOM: Ugo, versa correttamente l'acqua per favore.
Ugo, pour the water correctly please.
- *MOM: ma perché devi fare le cose in questo modo?
but why do you have to do it in this way?
3. *DAD: Ugo! ((cercando di colpire la mano di Ugo))
Ugo! ((trying to strike the hand of Ugo))
- *DAD: mi costringerai a darti uno schiaffo un giorno!
you will force me to give you a slap some day!
4. *LUI: perché tutta? ((riferendosi a Ugo che prende la bottiglia e versa tutta l'acqua nel suo bicchiere))
why all of it? ((referring to Ugo who takes the bottle and pours all the water into his glass))
5. *MOM: metti la bottiglia dietro di te. ((parlando a Ugo))
put the bottle behind you. ((talking to Ugo))
6. %pau: 4.0
7. *UGO: che sto facendo? ((parlando con DAD, che lo sta guardando da alcuni secondi))
what am I doing? ((talking to DAD, who has been looking at him for a few seconds))
8. *DAD: quello che hai fatto. non quello che stai facendo.
what you've done. not what you are doing.
9. *UGO: cosa ho fatto?
what have I done?
10. %pau: 2.0
11. *MOM: non lo sai. cosa hai fatto, Ugo?
you don't know, what have you done, Ugo?
12. *UGO: no.
no.
13. %pau: 1.5

14. *UGO: no: cosa ho fatto?
no: **what have I done?**
15. *MOM: non lo sai?
you don't know?
- *MOM: bene, la prossima volta te lo spiegheremo meglio
attraverso uno schiaffone, va bene?
**well, next time we will explain it better to you
through a big slap, right?**
- *MOM: perché altrimenti non hai capito.
because otherwise you have not understood.
16. *DAD: perché continui a fare lo stupido.
because you continue to behave stupidly.

Excerpt 2 concerns a sequence of conversation between the parents and the child around the contingent violation of a norm (how to pour the water correctly). The mother's intervention in turn 2 focuses attention on the inappropriate way used by Ugo: "*why do you have to do it in this way?*" implicitly assumes that "this way" is in contrast with another – correct – way to accomplish the action at stake. Immediately after, the father refers to a potential consequence of the inappropriate behavior of Ugo; in fact, the reference to the possibility of "a big slap" is intended as the fact that a punishment is always the effect of a violation of a rule. After the initial statements and requests of the parents (also with the intervention of the daughter in turn 3, "*why all of it?*"), Ugo replies in turn 7, after a pause, trying to justify himself and asking for more explanations. Then, the adults focus their interventions on the child's violation of a norm (turn 11, "*you don't know what you have done Ugo?*"), while Ugo tries to use the negation as reply to the parents' threats ("*no...no what have I done?*"). Finally, the parents close the sequence through a negative evaluation of the child (turn 16, "*you continue to behave stupidly*"), without providing an explanation of the child's conduct.

This example shows that not only social values can be transmitted implicitly but also behaviors that a social group considers as appropriate to a given situation. Ugo is manifestly making a "mistake" in the process of pouring some drinks but, interestingly, there is no attempt from either of his parents to explain or demonstrate the right way to do it. In other words, the adults take for granted that the young boy already masters the appropriate way to pour a drink from a bottle. Their irritation stems from the fact that Ugo, in their eyes, is doing it wrong not because of his lack of knowledge but because of his wish to act in a different way (probably observed in a restaurant).

The reconstruction of this argumentative discussion is summarized below:

<i>Issue</i>	Did Ugo pour the water correctly (in an acceptable way)?
<i>Standpoint</i>	(MOM and DAD) You are not pouring the water correctly
<i>Argument</i>	(MOM and DAD) You know that you are doing it incorrectly

We now turn to the analysis of the inferential configuration of the argument put forward by the mother: “You know that you are doing it incorrectly.” The reconstruction of the inferential configuration of this argument is illustrated below, in Figure 2:




Figure 2. AMT-based reconstruction of Mom’s argument in Excerpt 2.

On the right of the diagram the maxim on which the mother’s argument is based is specified: “If a person knows that doing action *p* is incorrect, then *p* should not be done.” This is another maxim engendered from the *locus from termination and setting up*. The minor premise of the topical syllogism is that “Ugo knows that he is performing his action incorrectly” which combined with the maxim leads to the following final conclusion: “Ugo should not pour the water into the glass holding the bottle from the bottom with just one hand.” Looking at the endoxical dimension of the diagram, in this argument the endoxon is as follows: “At the meal table, all family members know when their behavior is correct or incorrect, that is, in our case, that they know how to be have to pour a drink correctly.” The minor premise, “Ugo is pouring the water into the glass in the wrong way,” combined with the endoxon, produces the conclusion that “Ugo knows that he is performing his action incorrectly.” This excerpt is interesting notably because it seems to contain a paradox. Indeed, when adults try to teach an appropriate behavior to a child, they usually show or explain the correct use explicitly. In the literature, such learning processes have been described through the concept of *scaffolding*, i.e. the process of helping children’s learning by controlling the elements of the task that are initially

beyond the learners' ability and by giving them the opportunity to concentrate on the elements that are within their range of competence (Wood, Bruner & Ross, 1976, p. 90). In our example, such a scaffolding is strongly denied because the parents are convinced that their child is aware of the right way to proceed. In a way, we could speak here of a "negative scaffolding," with adults insisting on the fact that it is impossible for the child not to know what he was doing wrong. This emphasis shows *implicitly* how certain sorts of gestures are expected in social settings, like during mealtimes, and how parents take for granted that everyone in the family will submit to this way of behaving.

In family settings, it is actually not unusual that important norms are indicated, so to say, *by the negative*, either by insisting on the fact that it is impossible that someone does not know them already (as in Excerpt 2), or by being extremely vague about an element that is crucial (but that one is not supposed to talk about). This latter example is typically encountered in the case of a subject marked by political correctness, as in the next excerpt.

Excerpt 3.

Swiss family. Participants: father (DAD, 36 years), mother (MOM, 34 years), Stefano (STE, 8 years, 5 months), Alessandro (ALE, 4 years, 6 months). Except for DAD, who is in the kitchen, all family members are seated at the table in the dining room. MOM and STE sit on the left-hand side of the table, while ALE sits on the opposite side.

1. *MOM: stamattina c'era una discussione al supermercato, sugli Ecuadoriani
this morning there was a discussion at the grocery store, on the Ecuadorians
- *MOM: sembra che occupino quasi la metà dei parcheggi del supermercato
it seems that they took possession of almost half of the grocery store's parking
- *MOM: fanno il bagno nel fiume, poi uccidono i pesci
they wash themselves in the river, then kill the fish
- *MOM: fanno il bucato nel fiume
they wash clothes in the river
2. *DAD: si: me l'ha detto anche Marco ((un amico di Papà))
yes: even Marco ((Dad's friend)) told me about it
3. %pau: 1.0
4. *STE: perché fanno il bagno nel fiume?
why do they wash themselves in the river?
5. *MOM: perché sono poveri, e non hanno un lavoro
because they are poor, and don't have a job
- *MOM: se avessero un lavoro, vivrebbero a casa loro
if they had a job, they would live in their own home
- %pau: 2.0
6. *STE: e allora: dovrebbero dargli un lavoro
then they should give them a job
- *STE: così non uccidono i pesci!
so that they don't kill the fish!

7. *DAD: è già dura per noi:
it is already hard for us:
8. *MOM: vi piace il minestrone? [=! guardando i bambini]
do you like the soup? [=! looking at the children]
9. *ALE: brucia!
It's burning me!
10. *MOM: allora aspetta un attimino che si raffredda
then wait a moment for it to cool down

Excerpt 3 involves the mother, the father, and their son Stefano. The mother introduces the topic by saying to Dad that at the grocery store there was a discussion about a group of Ecuadorians. In particular, the fact that the Ecuadorians took possession of part of the grocery store's parking, that they take baths and wash their clothes in the river, and that they are killing the fish, are the elements under discussion. In turn 2, Dad confirms the plausibility of these topics by saying that a friend of his, Marco, already told the same story. At this point, in turn 4, Stefano decides to take part in this discussion and asks his parents why this group of people take baths in the river. The mother replies to her son that the Ecuadorians do this because they are poor and they don't have a job (turn 5). She also comments on the fact that if they had a job, they would not act in that way. Now, Stefano advances a standpoint, "then they should give them a job," accompanied by an argument in its support "so that they don't kill the fish" (turn 6). The father disagrees with his son and puts forth an argument (turn 7) against the standpoint of giving the Ecuadorians a job: "It is already very hard for us." This discussion is interrupted by an intervention by the mother who switches to a different topic, asking both children if they like the soup (turn 10).

This example is a good illustration of how children are not only informed about their environment via explicit testimony but also via *what is not said*. In this discussion, the father and the mother first depict a situation where strangers, by their behaviors, start to disturb the tranquility of the village. Once the situation is understood, Stefano proposed an apparently good solution: find them a job, so they do not have to adopt these behaviors anymore. The concise answer stated by the father ("it is already very hard for us") is full of innuendo and is very hard for an 8-year-old to comprehend. The first implicit is that it is hard for everyone to find a job; it refers to an economic situation that belongs to the sociological background. The second implicit is contained in the "us," that implies a radical difference between people "from here" and the Ecuadorians (Kaufmann, 2002). The boundary of this "us" is, by the way, not obvious: it is most likely not the members of the family but the larger "us" of fellow citizens. The final implicit is that the State should prioritize help to people that really "belong" to the country. This statement is even more implicit than the others because of its political incorrectness. Indeed, we can suspect that the eagerness of the mother to change the topic of the conversation is linked

to the difficulty in explicitly stating such a position, notably in front of a child who just took a moral perspective about the strangers' situation.

The reconstruction of the argumentative discussion between Stefano and his father is summarized below:

<i>Issue</i>	Should the Ecuadorians be supported to find a job?
<i>Standpoint(s)</i>	(STE) Yes, they should
	(DAD) No, they should not
<i>Argument(s)</i>	(STE) So that they don't kill the fish
	(DAD) It is already very hard for us

In the analysis of this argumentative discussion, we will focus on the argument put forth by the father: "It is already very hard for us." The reconstruction of its inferential configuration is illustrated below, in Figure 3:




Figure 3. AMT-based reconstruction of Dad's argument in Excerpt 3.

In this third example, the argument is based on a maxim that is engendered from the *locus from alternatives*: "If two alternatives cannot both be realized at the same time, the accomplishment of one excludes the accomplishment of the other" (see Greco Morasso, 2011, pp. 127–129). The reasoning follows with a syllogistic (i.e. inferential) structure, "In Switzerland, the Swiss must be supported before the Ecuadorians in finding a job" (minor premise), which leads to the conclusion that "In Switzerland, Ecuadorians must not be supported to find a job." Looking at the left side of the diagram, the endoxon is as

follows: “When finding a job, citizens must be supported before foreigners.” The datum, “In Switzerland, the Ecuadorians do not have a job. It is very hard for Swiss to find a job too,” combined with the endoxon leads to the conclusion that “In Switzerland, Swiss must be supported before the Ecuadorians in finding a job.”

From the point of view of children’s socialization, this excerpt is particularly illustrative. To accept the father’s conclusion, the endoxon has, by definition, to go “without saying.” According to the parents, their child has to figure somehow out what is so obvious to them in this situation (national preference). However, what is taken for granted by parents is, in this case, apparently not obvious from the child’s perspective. Unlike his father, the child is convinced that the Ecuadorians should be supported to find a job so that they don’t kill the fish. The endoxon on which the father’s argument is based (“When finding a job, citizens must be supported before foreigners”) is, therefore, not entirely shared between the parents and the child. One may ask why this has occurred. To answer this question, we need to look at the datum: “In Switzerland, the Ecuadorians do not have a job. It is very hard for Swiss to find a job too”. We think that only a part of the information included in the datum is known by the child (*In Switzerland, the Ecuadorians do not have a job*), while he does not know that *it is very hard for Swiss to find a job too*. This lack of information by the child could be, in our opinion, the reason at the basis of the difference of opinion between the parents and the child.

7. Discussion and conclusion

The three excerpts presented above illustrate specific ways in which what is left implicit in argumentative discussions plays a major role in socialization processes. The first excerpt highlights the role of sarcasm and irony in the depiction of a position that does not respect something that belongs to the cultural background (marriage is an essential component of a successful life). The second excerpt shows that parents can communicate implicitly not only certain abstract concepts but also ways of behaving. Lastly, the third excerpt illustrates how implicit communication can convey “pieces” of ideology. In conclusion, it is interesting to make *explicit* in each case how what is left implicit in argumentation could play an important role in the shaping of common ground between children and parents.

The example of Manuela, who declares that she does not want to marry anyone when she becomes an adult, can be metaphorically seen as a *reductio ad absurdum*. The proposition “it is normal/desirable for a girl to get married” is never explicitly formulated. On the contrary, the father’s argumentative effort aims to show that his daughter’s desire can only be based on a distorted vision of reality. The lifestyle that is valued by the group is therefore *indirectly* emphasized as the *typical* life path for a young girl.

In the case of Ugo, we have seen that the way he is pouring the water is almost outrageous to his parents. By refusing to explicitly state or show what he is supposed to do and by insisting on the fact that he cannot be ignorant of his misbehavior, they indicate how taken for granted the “normal” way to pour water is. The exchange takes place as if the boy were usurping a role, trying to be someone (a waiter) that he is not, especially not in the context of a family meal.

The case of Stefano and the Ecuadorians is probably the most complex and exciting from the point of view of socialization processes. The topic is difficult to tackle for the parents, who most likely want their son to behave morally and be charitable to others. However, the father is implicitly implying that not everyone is equal in such circumstances and that privileges should be granted to “people like us.” It is not easy to imagine how children can clarify such presuppositions. What is important to note is that the father’s statement could have a shared meaning only if the notion of “national preference” is activated as background information. At this stage, it is most likely that Stefano will learn from this dialogue much of what Sperber (1985) calls “semi-propositional” representations, i.e. half-understood concepts or ideas that can serve as an intermediary toward a fuller understanding. In our example, Stefano probably notices that there is something special about “them” compared to “us” and that an action that seems reasonable (giving them a job) is not applicable to everyone.

These excerpts also have the advantage of demonstrating a significant consequence of the use of implicits in argumentation within socialization processes. Contrary to usual testimonies, children are not able to increase their knowledge via explicitly communicated propositional contents: they have to build the background elements that will give meaning to the ongoing arguments by themselves. This aspect is central once placed within the context of epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010). If we accept that, to avoid the risk of being manipulated, human beings have a set of cognitive mechanisms to “filter” communicated information, and implicit transmission facilitates the assimilation of what is “taken for granted” in a community. Indeed, as children do not have access to a proposition (like “Swiss citizens must be supported prior to strangers to find a job”), it is very hard to check the reliability of such a conception. Moreover, in trying to figure out the background of the argument, children have to generate certain hypotheses *on their own* about what others seem to take for granted. As these inferences or assumptions are internally produced, they are even more resistant to epistemic vigilance, whose function is to check information communicated by others.

Hopefully, our excerpts illustrate sufficiently how implicits in argumentation are particularly effective in transmitting what is taken for granted in any given cultural community. First of all, they are based on *presuppositions*, i.e. background information not explicitly indicated as relevant. Information conveyed by presuppositions

has the property, even if what is presupposed is new and relevant, of appearing as old, given and as not relevant in its own right (de Saussure, 2013). As Ducrot (1969) stated, when an idea is introduced via a presupposition, everything happens as if the hearer cannot do otherwise than to accept it: the interlocutors share a kind of ontological *complicity*. Moreover, when implicits and presuppositions are used in argumentation with children, such a complicity is even further accentuated. Firstly, children are largely dependent on adults for their well-being as well as for their knowledge acquisition. In such a dependent condition, it is difficult to imagine how children could question what is presupposed by the persons who are taking care of them. Secondly, we have seen that the background necessary to understand an argument is often not present in younger minds. Children have therefore to figure out (initially vaguely) a certain context that enables them to make sense of the ongoing dialogue. This background will progressively be enriched thanks to other interactions. However, as it is “internally produced,” it is very hard for the younger members of any social community to figure out that this common ground is not *natural*.

Finally, we would like to highlight the relevance of paying particular attention to the context-based micro-level discourses that are framing and shaping argumentation as a dialogue-driven and context-specific communication process within family conversations. In fact, field-dependency of argumentative discourse relies primarily on the consideration of the social context (the family as a community, in our case) within which discourse is embedded. To understand how argumentative strategies are related to particular context-based activities about the family as a community of practice and to what extent argumentation practices are shaped by socio-cultural and interpersonal factors have been the objectives of our chapter. For this reason, the results of our investigation can contribute to the wider theme of argumentative practices and debates on societal and family issues: in particular, we have highlighted the interplay between different elements of argumentative practices, such as the social need to provide evidence for a particular assertion and the pragmatic functions of argumentation during a discussion. In this vein, talk and activities are viewed as the relevant units for the analysis of family dinnertime interactions, to shed light on situated frameworks that adults and children co-construct through their strategic maneuvering during everyday exchanges (Pontecorvo & Arcidiacono, 2016). Family interactions constitute a favorable discursive arena involving children and adults through different intersubjective positions that are shaped within the contingent context of discussion. Assuming the perspective highlighted by Rogoff (2003), argumentation as cultural activity contributes not only to giving conditions for defining development, but also to framing the context in which the development is supported.

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Appendix 1. Length of recordings, family members, average age of participants

Family group	Italian	Swiss
Length of recordings in minutes	20–37	19–42
Mean length of recordings in minutes	32.41	35.12
Participants		
Mothers	5	5
Fathers	5	5
Adults, total	10	10
Son	6	6
Daughter	4	7
Children	10	13
Total participants	20	23
Average age of participants		
Mother	36.40 (SD 2.881)	34.80 (SD 1.643)
Father	38.40 (SD 3.209)	37.00 (SD 1.581)
Parents	37.40 (SD 3.062)	35.90 (SD 1.912)
Son	7.50 (SD 3.619)	5.83 (SD 1.835)
Daughter	4.00 (SD 1.414)	4.86 (SD 2.268)
First-born	8.00 (SD 2.00) (4 sons; 1 daughter)	7.60 (SD .894) (3 sons; 2 daughters)
Second-born	3.20 (SD .447) (2 sons; 3 daughters)	4.40 (SD .548) (2 sons; 3 daughters)
Third-born	0	3 (SD .000) (1 son; 2 daughters)

Appendix 2. Transcription conventions

*	indicates the speaker's turn
[...]	not-transcribed segment of talking
(())	segments added by the transcriber in order to clarify some elements of the situation
[=!]	segments added by the transcriber to indicate some paralinguistic features
xxx	inaudible utterance(s)
%act:	description of speaker's actions
%sit:	description of the situation/setting
,	continuing intonation
.	falling intonation
:	prolonging of sounds
?	rising intonation
!	exclamatory intonation
→	maintaining the turn of talking by the speaker
%pau:	pause
@End	end of the family meal